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bidden from issuing "golden parachutes,"
which provide big severance payments to execuTo a casual observer, hostile corporate take- tives displaced by a hostile acquirer. And takeovers may seem as pointless and destructive a over targets would not be allowed either to isform of modern warfare as the Iran/Iraq con- sue major new blocks of voting securities (so
flict. "Raiders" strike with bear hugs, junk as to dilute the value of the offeror's shares) or
bonds, and two-tier tender offers. Incumbent buy back chunks of shares (so as to keep them
managers respond with poison pills, greenmail away from the offeror) without the approval of
payments, shark repellents, and golden para- a majority shareholder vote. Companies would
chutes. Congress is wearying of the strife, and also be prohibited from making "greenmail"
may soon impose a cease-fire on the combatants payments to raiders (buying out their holdings
-but to whose benefit?
at a substantial premium to get them to go
Last term, Representative Timothy Wirth away) without affirmative shareholder approv(Democrat, Colorado) introduced H.R. 5693, al. Such repurchases have angered stockholdthe "Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984," which ers who do not share in the greenmail premiwould have made a number of changes in the ums, and who often see the value of their shares
law governing takeovers:
decline sharply when the greenmail recipient
Once a buyer had acquired 5 percent of withdraws from the bidding.
a target firm it would have to cease acquiring
H.R. 5693 was sent to the floor by the
stock for two days, unless the Securities and House Energy and Commerce Committee, but
Exchange Commission gave an earlier go-ahead. was withdrawn in the closing days of the sesIt would also have to file a public notice with sion. Similar proposals were introduced in the
the SEC-and thereby alert the target's man- Senate, and are likely to be introduced again
agement-within twenty-four hours of the pur- this term. Reaction has been mixed. Last year
chase. (Currently the Williams Act allows ten the SEC supported restrictions on many takedays to file such a notice.) If it proceeded to over tactics, but it now seems to have stepped
seek control of the target through a tender of- back from any endorsement of further federal
fer, it would have to keep the offer open for tinkering. The Treasury Department broadly
forty calendar days (current regulation re- warns against restricting takeovers "in the
name of fairness to shareholders, [when] those
quires twenty business days).
Furthermore, a buyer would have to no- same shareholders are the ones who benefit
tify the SEC in a public filing of its intentions from such activities," and says it finds "no sys"to make any major change which would affect tematic evidence that takeover activity has
the communities in which [the target] operates done anything other than increase national
[or] which would substantially affect its wealth and improve efficient allocation of cormanagement, labor organizations, or employ- porate resources."
Some critics of takeovers decry them as
ees." Existing law requires the buyer to notify
the SEC of its background, of whether it in- part of a trend toward "paper entrepreneurtends to acquire control of the business, and of ism." Recent scholarship, however, suggests
many other factors, but does not require the that they serve a productive purpose. A 1983
article in the Journal of Financial Economics,
filing of a "community impact statement."
The bill would also restrict a variety of surveying economic studies of the market for
defensive tactics by target management. During corporate control, concluded that both bidders
tender offers, target companies would be for- and targets realize positive returns from suc-
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cessful takeovers. That shareholders of the target firm earn a profit is no surprise, Since raiders invariably offer a premium for the shares
they buy. Even the threat of a takeover may
spur existing managers to work harder to increase the value of their stockholders' shares.
To some, perhaps, more surprisingly, the shareholders of the raider also benefit in the long
run. Takeovers allow worse managers to be replaced by better, and generate the other sorts
of productive efficiencies associated with mergers. So why the sudden rush to regulate?
The House committee report on H.R. 5693
recognizes that takeovers can produce economic benefits, but says they may also "result in the
loss of jobs, cause management to focus upon
short-term stock performance instead of longterm prospects, and reduce the amount of credit available for other productive purposes."
These complaints are familiar. The spectre of
job loss (and its related spectre of disruption
to communities) is also invoked to argue
against mergers and foreign imports; in both
cases the prospect of reduced labor inputs looks
suspiciously like the flip side of the opportunity
for greater efficiency (and more jobs in other
communities or businesses). As for the effect
of takeovers on credit demand, it is wrong to
imagine that a takeover will cause a "lump of
credit" to vanish forever from the capital market; when shareholders of the target firm are
paid off, the capital will flow back into the market. Takeovers may tie up small amounts of
capital for a few weeks, but the banks and other
financing parties appear to consider this more
productive than the alternative uses they might
have for the money. And the fear that takeovers
trap management into "short-term thinking"
assumes that by maximizing reported shortterm profits, management succeeds in deceiving shareholders as to the long-run prospects
of the company. If shareholders are well informed, after all, they will discount and capitalize poor long-term prospects in the current
price of the stock, which will promptly penalize management for short-sighted decisions.
The fear of takeover gives management an incentive to improve reported results in deceptive ways, but so do many other pressures.
A different line of argument holds that
while takeovers in general may be efficient, it
is abusive for different groups of stockholders
to receive different prices for their stock. This

would imply banning not only "greenmail" but
also "two-tier" tender offers, in which the acquirer offers a high price (or cash) for a controlling block of stock, and a low price (or securities) for the remaining minority shares.
These offers, it is said, can stampede shareholders into accepting inferior offers for fear of being locked into a minority position. But an SEC
study suggests that banning two-tier offers
might actually harm target shareholders by
reducing the overall number of tender offers.
Although shareholders might in theory get
higher premiums when single-tier offers were
made, fewer offers would be made-and fewer
premiums paid-in the first place.
Robert Reich has argued that managers are
distracted from business affairs when they concentrate on fending off a hostile invader. But
managers are never forced to defend their incumbency; they can simply stand aside and let
the shareholders decide. To be sure, takeover
offers sometimes provoke incumbent managers
into taking "poison pills" whose effect is almost
certainly to harm shareholders. The remedy
that suggests itself, however, is to put restrictions on the incumbents, not the raiders.
But although a stronger case might be
made for restricting defensive tactics, here too
there are doubts that a legislative solution
would work. Treasury points out that it would
be hard to draft a law that restricted abusive
defensive tactics without interfering with perfectly legitimate business activity. The SEC has
suggested that if filing a tender offer were to
trigger sweeping restraints on target management, raiders might have a better blackmail tool
than ever: threatening to tie up the targets'
operations with below-market offers. Federal
Trade Commission Chairman James C. Miller
III has said that although he supports the principle of a law to control abusive defensive tactics, he would prefer simply to even the playing
field by removing existing restraints on bidders.
Another consequence of the congressional
proposals to restrict defensive tactics, and further to restrict takeovers, would be to extend
federal law into areas traditionally left to state
and marketplace regulation. State courts (and
federal courts interpreting state law) decide
corporate governance issues through case-bycase adjudication. The "business judgment
rule," under which courts will not second-guess
management decisions that can be attributed
REGULATION, MARCH/APRIL 1985
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In BriefCrackdown on Low Prices. Despite
the widespread view that railroads
and truckers are being deregulated,
the Interstate Commerce Commission continues to pester carriers
and shippers for agreeing to excessively low rates. In March the commission acted to resolve a complaint from its enforcement arm
seeking treble damages against two
railroads and a shipper for an alleged undercharge.
At issue was what happens when
a railroad ships hazardous materials to a customer that is not yet
ready to unload them. "For obvious
reasons," as commissioner Frederic Andre says, "railroads prefer
not to hold such cars in their
switching yards any longer than
necessary." Thus the railroad
shunts the cars to a side track
on the receiver's property until
the customer is prepared to unload
them. ICC officials had long given
informal assurances that since the
railroad conducts the shunting
movement for its own benefit, it
does not have to charge the cus-

tomer an extra fee to cover the separate movement.
The commission's enforcement
arm, which is whimsically named
the Office of Compliance and Consumer Assistance, sought to overturn this practice in its complaint.
In March the full commission
agreed with the railroads and shippers that the practice could continue, but OCCA continues to question alleged undercharges elsewhere. "It is little wonder that
the Interstate Commerce Commission is sometimes perceived as
anti-shipper," wrote Commissioner
Andre, "when our enforcement
agents are spending a substantial
portion of their budget to harass
shippers for allegedly paying too
little for transportation, even when
both shipper and railroad have
agreed that the correct charges
were paid."
Goodbye, Mr. Chips. A key element
of the ICC's retreat from deregulatory activism, according to commission insiders, has been its gradual but systematic elimination of

reformers' staff positions. The

agency's Office of Transportation
Analysis, a one-time hotbed of procompetition advocacy, has come
under particular pressure. It would

to any rational business purpose, has traditionally afforded corporate managers virtual carte
blanche, absent a Showing of self-dealing. To
Some, this suggests that the competition among
states like Delaware and Nevada to supply corporate law has led to a "race to the bottom" in
providing shareholder protection. To others, it
suggests that the market has fixed on better
ways to control managerial self-interest or in-

competence than judicial oversight, whether
through provisions in corporate charters, contracts with managers (including stock options
and other incentive arrangements), or simply
the discipline of stock pricing.
In a recent decision (Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney Pace, Inc. 1984), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested that
management decisions about the use of defensive tactics in takeovers will be scrutinized
more closely than in other contexts. This parallels the heightened judicial scrutiny that is tra6
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be cut from forty-one to thirty positions if the Senate adopts the
recommendation of its Appropriations Committee. "Though this
office might serve to inform the
Congress and the public about
the implications of deregulation
and the current economic status
of the various activities monitored
by the Commission, it has rather
served to promote further deregulation by administrative fiat," says
the report by the subcommittee
that oversees ICC funding-which

is headed by Senator Mark
Andrews (North Dakota), a Republican who has been critical of deregulation.
Twinkle, Twinkle. In one of the
more unusual ventures in the commercialization of outer space, entrepreneurs are planning to launch
human ashes into orbit. The promoters hope to use shiny spacecraft so that bereaved earthlings
could more easily view the departed.

In a letter to the editor of Science, Jan Beyea of the National
Audubon Society warns that this is
"the beginning of a new visual
form of pollution, the cosmic equivalent of billboards on highways." A
resourceful advertiser, Beyea sug-

ditional in other areas where executives have a
conflict of interest or self-dealing is likely. The
committee report on H.R. 5693 hailed the Norlin decision, but warned that "it will continue
to monitor this area of law carefully to determine whether legislation is warranted," and
in fact Wirth has filed preemptive federal legislation (H.R. 5695) to alter the business judgment rule.
However, the lobbying for restraints on
raiders is stronger than for restraints on targets, with business executives leading the
charge against the hostile takeovers that so often cost them their jobs. In an August 1984
Louis Harris survey, about two-thirds of senior
corporate executives polled said that hostile
takeovers were bad for the economy (but nonhostile acquisitions good), and 70 percent
thought that the bidder has "the advantage,"
presumably an unfair one, in a takeover battle.
A majority of the executives would ban two-tier

PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

gests, could launch dozens of reflective objects arranged so as to
form letters or words. "Twenty
years from now, will we walk out
at night to see the word "Coke"
emblazoned in the sky?"
Not if the regulators can be mobilized in time. "Congress should
extend the authority it has given
the Department of Transportation
to regulate private launches and
allow it to limit the brightness of
private space payloads-a `Space
Beautification' addition to the Commercial Space Transportation Act."
All Quiet on the Pork-Barrel Front.
Last year the Pentagon spent al-

most $75 million to buy and ship
American coal to U.S. bases in
Europe-mostly anthracite, the
type of "hard coal" whose use has
been in long-term decline. Members of Congress from Pennsylvania have succeeded in passing appropriations riders requiring the Defense Department to pass up cheaper European suppliers in favor of
the U.S. product. Recently, Congress directed the Pentagon to
build up an unwanted one-year
stockpile of U.S. coal in Europe.
The army would prefer to hook
up to German utility systems for
its heating needs, but anthracite in-

dustry spokesmen have argued that
switching "would make our bases
dependent on German municipalities," in the words of a report in
Common Cause magazine. Unfortunately, such dependence will not
go away no matter where the coal
comes from: the coal boilers themselves need water and electricity to
operate, and municipal German
utilities are the sole suppliers of
both.

Prometheus Unbound. There are
signs of a "new-found aggressiveness" at General Motors, our number one auto maker, according to a
Wall Street Journal article. Since
taking office in 1980, Chairman
Roger B. Smith "has transformed
GM from a shrinking, bureaucratic
giant into an organization in which
the only constant is change." The
company has begun expanding in
nonautomotive areas and experi-

menting with sophisticated new
production techniques.
"Mr. Smith portrayed himself as
making changes his immediate
predecessors couldn't because they
had to direct their executives' energies toward solving problems imposed by government regulations,
particularly those relating to safety, fuel economy and pollution con-

trol," the Journal account says.
"Now that most of those regulatory problems have been solved and
deregulation is in vogue, Mr. Smith
believes he can focus his subordinates' efforts on expanding GM's
business."
For many businesses, the freeing
of executives' creative energies
must be the single most important
benefit from deregulation. Unfortunately, it is a benefit that is nearly impossible to quantify in regulatory impact or cost-benefit analyses.

Man Bites Dog. It finally happened. A government decided to remove the beam from its own eye
before complaining about its neighbor's mote.
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
of Canada said February 1 that he
would restrain his criticism of U.S.
inaction on acid rain until Canada
"cleans up its own act." Mulroney
added that "we have to stop blaming them exclusively" and that "in
point of fact we are behind the
Americans in emission control in
many significant areas." Policy observers are now on the lookout for
such unexpected events as a month
of Sundays, a blue moon, and the
freezing over of Hell.

Even if the agreed-on aim were genuine
tender offers and greenmail, require 5 percent
buyers to inform the target management im- neutrality between bidders and targets, it is
mediately, and require 20 percent holders to doubtful that new federal legislation could
make a tender offer for the remaining shares. achieve that goal. Consider the history of past
Not surprisingly, these numbers are reversed federal forays into corporate regulation-all of
when restraints on target management are at which have resulted in controls on bidders, not
issue. Over two-thirds of the executives oppose incumbent managements. The Williams Act was
restricting the amount of its own stock a target intended to be neutral, but in practice it brought
company can reacquire to block takeovers, over about an immediate and substantial reduction
half oppose outlawing golden parachutes, and in the number of tender offers (a 40 percent
a plurality reject restrictions on stock dilution reduction in the year after passage), which did
by targets. Harris sums it up: "What executives not return to previous levels for nine years. This
really want is for the acquirer to be hemmed in, is hardly surprising: one key to a successful
but not themselves."
takeover attempt is to strike quickly, before the
Interestingly, 80 percent of the executives incumbent management can mobilize a defense,
agreed that ordinary shareholders do "very" or and the Williams Act delays the process.
"moderately" well in both friendly and hostile
The Williams Act did not restrict open
takeovers. On average, target company share- market purchases of stock, which became inholders appear to earn premiums in excess of creasingly popular as a takeover tool. By the
30 percent. No poll has been taken on whether mid-1970s, the traditional tender offer looked
shareholders are eager to give up these gains.
so unattractive by comparison that some were
REGULATION, MARCH/APRIL 1985

7

PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

"I knew it! Whenever you

absorb a company, you get so perky!"

Drawing by William Hamilton; © 1980 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

predicting large-scale shifts to open market
purchases as the favored takeover method.
Then the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 came along, imposing "waiting periods" on large stock purchasers that
were longer than those the Williams Act imposed on tender offerors. The stated intent of
the 1976 law was to give the FTC and Justice
Department time to decide whether to challenge major acquisitions on antitrust grounds.
But by taking away the advantage of open
market purchases over tender offers, it may
have unintentionally prevented a dramatic evolution in takeover tactics.
In the end, however, the decisive issue in
the current debate may have nothing to do with
the offensive/defensive balance. Underlying
many takeover discussions-sometimes openly,
sometimes not-is the question of merger policy. Corporate takeovers often, though not always, lead to corporate mergers-whether the
target firm falls to the "raider" or the "white
knight." The activities of T. Boone Pickens, for
AEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

example, led to two of the largest mergers in
history by driving Gulf Oil into the arms of
Chevron and Cities Service into the arms of
Occidental Petroleum. Although government
policy and academic opinion have both shifted
dramatically toward a more favorable view of
mergers in recent years, old-fashioned trustbusters remain unconvinced. (A piquant irony
is that the "bust-up artist," who specializes in
splitting his targets into smaller companies, is
universally despised even though he accomplishes deconcentration at a profit.)
The drive to regulate takeovers may afford
the opponents of industrial concentration a
chance to regain through regulation of the securities market the ground they have lost in
antitrust policy. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
sought to regulate mergers and wound up regulating takeovers. It would not be unprecedented
for takeover legislation-by intention or notto wind up effecting significant changes in merger policy.

PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Regulation and the 1986 Budget
The books have now been closed on four years
of Reagan administration budget policy in the
regulatory area, and we can therefore assess
how things have changed, if at all, in the course
of the 1981-84 period. In brief, the Reagan budgets to date show a trend toward a different allocation of spending among federal regulatory
agencies, but not a lower overall amount. That
may change in the future, as the administration
appears ready to revive once again its push to
cut spending by federal regulators.
The summary figures shown here are adapted from the annual roundup of regulatory agency budgets and staffs prepared by the Center
for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. They include final
regulatory budget figures for the past two fiscal
years, together with the administration's pro-

ulatory spending for 1981, the last budget year
from the Carter administration.
There have, however, been some significant
shifts in where the federal regulatory dollar is
being spent. In constant dollars, expenditures
for "social regulation"-such areas as consumer and occupational safety and health, energy,
and the environment-fell about 6 percent between 1980 and 1984. In the same period, expenditures for "economic regulation"-finance
and banking, regulation in such specific industries as communications and commodities, and
general business regulation in such areas as securities and patents-rose about 10 percent.
This shift in regulatory priorities appears to be
continuing in 1985, with the budget fraction allocated to economic regulation creeping up
from about 18 to about 19 percent of the total.
For 1986 the administration has announced
its intention to stop shuffling the regulatory
deck and begin cutting it once again. It plans
no significant further shift in spending from
social to economic regulation, but does propose
cuts in overall spending. In nominal dollars, the
1986 budget for federal regulation amounts to
something just under a freeze: total expenditures are slated to decline, overall, by about 0.3
percent. In constant dollars, however, the budget represents a cut roughly equal to the rate of

jections for 1985 and budget proposals for fiscal.
1986. It should be noted that. this year's figures
from the CSAB are not comparable to those
summarized in this space in earlier years. The
main difference is that the dollar figures now
cover obligations rather than outlays.
The explosive growth in spending by the
federal regulatory bureaucracy during the 1970s
has been contained. But it has not been reversed. From the last year of the
Carter presidency to the last year
EXPENDITURES ON FIFTY-SIX REGULATORY AGENCIES
of Reagan's first term, total federal
Selected Fiscal Years, 1970-86
employment by regulatory agencies
1986
1985
has declined significantly, by about
1970 1980 1983 1984 (est.)
Area
14 percent overall. Apparently this
EXPENDITURES ($ billions)
reduction in employment has been Social Regulation
more or less offset by increases in
Consumer Safety & Health
$ 0.9
Job Safety & Other
outside contracting or by in-house
Working Conditions
$ 0.1
cost inflation, however, because toEnergy & the Environment
2.2
$ 0.3
tal spending measured in constant
5.7
6.0
1.3
dollars has not changed much.
Economic Regulation
This apparently level trend
Finance & Banking
$ 0.1
over a four-year interval in fact
Other Industry-Specific
0.3
$ 0.1
General Business
0.4
$ 0.1
masks a V-shaped pattern in be1.1
0.3
1.3
tween. Spending dropped precipitately in the first full Reagan budg- TOTAL
6.8
$ 1.6
3.8
$ 1.7
et (for 1982), but in the succeeding TOTAL IN 1972 DOLLARS*
PERMANENT FULL-TIME POSITIONS (thousands)
three years it inched steadily back
65.5 103.6
88.6
up to the 1980 levels. If current Social Regulation
19.9
27.8
25.4
estimates hold, federal regulatory Economic Regulation
85.4 131.5 114.0
spending in 1985, the last budget TOTAL
year in Reagan's first term, will al- *Adjusted by GNP deflator (actual and, for later years, estimated in budget).
most exactly match real-dollar reg- Source: Adapted from figures of the Center for the Study of American Business.
REGULATION, MARCH/APRIL
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CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT FOR TWENTY-EIGHT REGULATORY AGENCIES

Permanent
Full-Time Positions
1985

Agency

(est.)

1984

Consumer Product
Safety Commission
Food &Drug Administration

National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration
Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms
TOTAL, Consumer Safety &
Health

Percent
Increase
1986 (Decrease)

1.6)
3.8)

558

7,168

7,084

640

3,038

0.7)

11,404

2.1)

3,271

9.0)

2,355

3.2)

Mine Safety & Health

Administration

Occupational Safety & Health
Administration
Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission
National Labor Relations Board
TOTAL, Job Safety & Other
Working Conditions
Economic Regulatory
Administration
Office of Surface Mining
Environmental Protection Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
TOTAL, Energy

3,125
3,213

3,000

11,964

4.9)

377
849
10,141

11,473

3,332

3,351

906

and the

Environment

14,699

Comptroller of the Currency
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
National Credit Union
Administration

3,250

3,250

3,554
1,327

1,335

Finance and Banking

8,515

8,525

363

--

TOTAL,

Civil Aeronautics Board*
Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
Federal Communications
Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Interstate Commerce Commission
TOTAL,

6.6)

Industry-Specific
Regulation

384

-

557

6.4)

1,976
1,564
232

240

1,023

844

7.3)

5,715

International Trade Commission
Patent & Trademark Office
Antitrust Division**
Federal Election Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Securities & Exchange Commission

1,023
3,286

844
3,438

704
225

649
232

7.8)

1,160

1,145
2,046

5.1)

2,021

TOTAL, General Business
TOTAL, TWENTY-EIGHT
AGENCIES

8,419

8,354

60,716

*Abolished in 1984.

**Included in earlier years under the heading "Social Regulation."
Source: Adapted from selected figures of the Center for the Study of American Business.
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inflation-about

4 percent. This

is not as large a drop as the 10

percent cut in fiscal 1982, Reagan's
first budget, but it is a bigger drop
than has been seen before or since.
Some of the more notable losers for 1986 include the Federal
Railroad Administration, down 18
percent; petroleum regulation in
the Department of Energy, down
17 percent; the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, down 17 percent; the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, down 12 percent; and the Civil
Aeronautics Board, down and out
at zero. Among the winners are the
Drug Enforcement Administration,
up 64 percent; the International
Trade Administration, up 29 percent; and the Environmental Protection Agency, up 12 percent. (All
percentages are calculated from
nominal dollar figures. ) Losers outnumber winners almost two to
one, but the gains of a few big winners (most especially the $2 billion
Environmental Protection Agency)
manage to hold the overall regulatory market fairly steady at just
under $9 billion.
And what of the real market
outside Washington? No one truly
knows. For industries vetted by
agencies such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration
( down 4 percent) or the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (down
6 percent), a smaller agency budget will presumably mean fewer inspections or recalls, fewer new
standards--in short, less regulation. But for industries whose activities are screened by agencies
that license new products and technologies-agencies such as the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(down 6 percent) or the Food and
Drug Administration (down 5 percent)-a smaller regulatory budget may in fact mean either more
or less regulation, depending on
where the cuts come from. The

PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

agency could react to the cuts in ways that
slow down approval, leaving the licensing more
clogged and impenetrable than ever, or it could
take down some of the hurdles that keep its examiners busy. In the end, the true "regulatory
budget" depends little on how much is spent
directly by Washington regulators. What matters is how much the rest of the country spends
in trying to appease them-and what, if anything, the country gains in return.

Bumpers to Bumpers in Court
Veterans of the last decade's regulatory debates
will recall the Bumpers amendment as a perennial passenger on the omnibus of congressional regulatory reform. The amendment had
to do with how judges should behave when they
scrutinize regulatory activity. Now, confusingly, along comes the bumpers decision, which
deals with some of the same issues of judicial
review of regulation. This time "bumpers" refers not to the senator from Arkansas but to the
small-"b" kind on automobiles.
Congress may have abandoned its search
for an omnibus regulatory reform package as
irrelevant or politically unachievable, but the
underlying controversies persist: how complete a factual basis must agencies establish
before they regulate? Can the White House interfere with agency actions? What can Congress do to make its wishes known? How deferential should judges be toward the agency
when the controversy winds up in their laps?
And should the standards differ when deregulation-the repeal or revision of existing rules
-is at issue? The Supreme Court's landmark
air-bag case last year addressed each of these
questions, and the appeals court's bumpers decision this January carries the analysis along
another step.
In 1971 the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, relying on a 1966 law, issued a
rule requiring that automobile bumpers be built
to withstand an impact of five miles per hour
in front and two-and-a-half mph in back without damage to the vehicle's "safety systems"its lighting, fuel, exhaust, cooling, or latching
components. Another part of the standard effectively required bumpers to be built at a
standard height. The idea was to prevent damage to head and tail lights during collisions and

also "bumper interlocks," which could tie up
traffic and force drivers to dart into traffic to
disentangle them.
As time went on NHTSA added elaborations to the rule, especially after a 1972 law
(the Cost Savings Act) gave it new powers to
combat economic losses to consumers as well
as injuries. The standard for rear bumpers was
increased step-wise until by the 1973 model year
they too had to survive a five mph crash. Then
the agency began requiring that the bumper be
strong enough to protect all the rest of the vehicle from damage in five mph crashes. Eventually even the bumper was permitted to incur
only minimal damage.
When the agency first issued the rule, it
simply assumed that protecting the integrity
of a car's safety systems in minor accidents
would help prevent subsequent accidents. Not
until later did it begin conducting tests and developing empirical evidence to test this hypothesis. A 1979 analysis concluded that the five
mph standard gave consumers a net benefit of
$39 compared with the two-and-a-half mph
standard. But that report came under criticism,
and the numbers were later reduced to a range
of $11-29. And a long-term study released by the
agency in 1981 indicated that the five mph front
standard was of only borderline cost-effectiveness, and the five mph rear standard clearly was
not cost-effective.
Not long after taking office, the Reagan administration announced that as part of its
promise to help the auto industry out of its financial morass NHTSA would propose a modification of the bumper standard. The agency
proceeded to issue a new rule reducing the
standard at both ends from 5.0 to 2.5 mph, lowering the crash velocity that the corners of a car
had to withstand, and eliminating the requirement that the bumper itself not suffer damage
in minimal collisions.
The usual plaintiffs-insurance companies
and their allied associations, along with the
Nader-founded Center for Auto Safety-went
to court to challenge the rollback. On January 5
of this year a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
the agency by a two-to-one majority (Center
for Auto Safety V. Peck.) The court has just
denied a rehearing en banc.
The majority and the dissent agreed that
the correct standard of review to apply was that
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enunciated by the Supreme Court in the air-bag
case (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
V. State Farm Mutual, 1983). There the Court
rejected the argument advanced in this space
that an agency should have wider latitude in
pruning back or eliminating old regulations
than in adopting new ones (see "Active Judges
and Passive Restraints," Perspectives, Regulation, July/August 1982). The Court acknowledged that agencies need to adapt their regulations to changing circumstances, but reasoned

that
the forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more reason to presume that changing circumstances require the rescission of prior
action, instead of a revision in or even the
extension of current regulation. If Congress established a presumption from
which judicial review should start, that
presumption ... is not against safety regulation, but against changes in current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking
record. [Emphasis in original.]
In short, regulations are like numbers in
algebra: there are positive and negative varieties but the applicable operations are the
same. The presumption of the Administrative
Procedure Act is not in favor of citizen autonomy, but in favor of the status quo-whether
unregulated or regulated.
If that were all there were to it, the inquiry
would have been done. But there is more to the
story.
Under the general principles of administrative law, an agency's choices in issuing a regulation are bounded by the statute under which it
operates and the record developed during the
rulemaking proceeding. The agency must examine the relevant data on the record and articulate an adequate explanation for its action
that includes a "rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made," as the
Court put it in the air-bag case. But since the
statute and the record rarely converge to permit
of only one possible interpretation, the agency
normally retains a range of discretion. The
choice of a particular regulation within that
range belongs to the agency and is governed
by politics, not law.
The first major question in the bumpers
case was what the relationship is between the
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range of discretion in the first proceeding and
the range of discretion in the second. Are the
two ranges coextensive, or does the agency's
choice in the first proceeding constrain its
choice in the second-and if so, how?
To the appellants, and possibly the dissent
(the interpretation is unclear), the agency's first
decision strongly constrained its second. To
abandon its first policy, the agency had to
muster outright proof that the change would
not reduce safety. It was not clear that NHTSA
had shouldered this burden. Its own data, along
with that submitted during the rulemaking
proceeding, did not convince the agency that
there was any measurable difference in the accident rate between the two standards. (A vicepresident of one of the appellants admitted
that it was an area where you "have to put some
judgment on.") But, of course, failing to uncover evidence of harm is not the same thing
as proving no harm.
The major importance of the decision lies
in the court's finding that although the agency
had to justify the change, it did not have to
sustain the burden of proof. The decision held
that the agency's
justification need not consist of affirmative
demonstration that the status quo is
wrong; it may also consist of demonstration, on the basis of careful study, that
there is no cause to believe that the status
quo is right, so that the existing rule has
no rational basis to support it.
Applying the principle of the "hard look," in
which the court delves deeply into the record
to determine whether the agency's choice was
arbitrary or capricious-that is, outside the
range of available discretion-the court examined the record in minute detail and found
that the agency had carried out that demonstration.
At first glance, the court's principle would
seem to create an asymmetry between regulation and deregulation. After all, an agency must
marshal affirmative evidence to justify an original regulation. Doubt is not enough. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
surely could not announce that since it had no
reason to believe that a given chemical was
safe, it was going to ban it.
The asymmetry, however, is only apparent.
Revision or repeal, unlike the original regula(Continues on page 56)
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Bumpers to Bumpers in Court
(Continued from page 12)
tion, does not take place ab initio; it occurs in
the context of the record established in the
original rulemaking. To measure rationality
only from the date at which revision began and
not from the time the original record was assembled is to throw away useful information
and ignore the APA's requirement that a court
assess an agency's actions in the light of all the
information on the record. An agency's actions
should be judged in their entirety.
This does not legalize repeal on demand.
Since there is a general principle that agencies
should explain changes in policy, the agency
may have to give a somewhat fuller explanation
of its reasons for the change than it gave for
the rule. In addition, the deregulating agency
must consider the experience derived from the
regulation. If a tentatively adopted regulation
has proved undeniably successful, overturning
it may no longer fall within the agency's range
of discretion, even though failing to enact it
would have.
The second major issue in the case was
how much detail an agency has to put forward
to support its conclusions. Some regulatory reformers have long complained that judges are
too deferential to the putative expertise of the
agencies. (Recall that the Bumpers amendment
would have removed the statutory presumption
of agency expertise.) The bumpers court accepted some challenged assumptions that the
agency acknowledged were based on the engineering judgment of its staff. The reason is
straightforward. Generalist judges cannot uncover glitches in these technical agency assumptions; they must rely on the parties, which presumably have both the access to technical expertise and the will to challenge agency assumptions, to do so for them during the proceeding.
This does not signal an attitude of blind
judicial deference, since the court accepted the
assumptions only after making sure that the
parties had had a chance to object to them during the rulemaking. It does mean that intervenors must bring forth their best arguments
in the public rulemaking, rather than holding
them back for a court appearance.
The appellants also argued that many congressional sponsors of the Cost Savings Act
were on record as indicating that they expected
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the statute to justify a five mph standard. This
legislative history, the appellants maintained,
should be a controlling sign of congressional intent. The court found this argument "luminescently invalid."
The legislative veto case made it clear that
Congress can act only by passing legislation.
Thus, if comments by individual members of
Congress can have any effect, it must be because
they illuminate what Congress as a whole meant
by the text of the legislation it passed, not because they indicate how the individual legislators would like the agency to administer the
legislation. The first bears on legislation; the
second bears on the execution of legislation,
which belongs squarely in the executive branch.
To be sure, the agency will want to consider the
will of members of Congress as part of its political deliberations, since members of Congress can influence executive policy through
oversight hearings and in many other ways. But
Congress's opinions on executive policy lack the
force of law that attaches to congressional enactments.
Much of what passes as "legislative history" suffers from the same practical and constitutional infirmities that inhered in the legislative veto: it is easily manipulated by subgroups within Congress as well as by outsiders
interested in the outcome, and it tends to blur
if not subvert the separation of powers. By
limiting legislative history to its proper role
of politically pertinent advice, the court follows the thrust of the "bubble case" last year
(see "The Bubble Upheld," Perspectives, Regulation, May/June 1984).
Finally, the court rejected the charge that
the White House had exerted undue political influence over the agency's actions. It noted that
in choosing within the range of discretion defined by the statute and the record, the agency
is free to consult political factors. So long as
the White House does not attempt to push the
agency outside those boundaries, its involvement is not only acceptable, the court found, but
indeed the way "the system is supposed to
work." (In any case, the court noted, it was
NHTSA's existing intent to take action that
drove the White House announcement rather
than the other way around.) Politics-or, if
you prefer, voter influence-in regulatory policy making is no longer taboo.

